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-rw-r--r--ext/openssl/ossl_cipher.c1145
1 files changed, 950 insertions, 195 deletions
diff --git a/ext/openssl/ossl_cipher.c b/ext/openssl/ossl_cipher.c
index 93b3f6ccf9..e9dcd943e3 100644
--- a/ext/openssl/ossl_cipher.c
+++ b/ext/openssl/ossl_cipher.c
@@ -1,48 +1,103 @@
/*
- * $Id$
* 'OpenSSL for Ruby' project
* Copyright (C) 2001-2002 Michal Rokos <m.rokos@sh.cvut.cz>
* All rights reserved.
*/
/*
- * This program is licenced under the same licence as Ruby.
- * (See the file 'LICENCE'.)
+ * This program is licensed under the same licence as Ruby.
+ * (See the file 'COPYING'.)
*/
#include "ossl.h"
-#define MakeCipher(obj, klass, ctx) \
- obj = Data_Make_Struct(klass, EVP_CIPHER_CTX, 0, ossl_cipher_free, ctx)
+#define NewCipher(klass) \
+ TypedData_Wrap_Struct((klass), &ossl_cipher_type, 0)
+#define AllocCipher(obj, ctx) do { \
+ (ctx) = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); \
+ if (!(ctx)) \
+ ossl_raise(rb_eRuntimeError, NULL); \
+ RTYPEDDATA_DATA(obj) = (ctx); \
+} while (0)
+#define GetCipherInit(obj, ctx) do { \
+ TypedData_Get_Struct((obj), EVP_CIPHER_CTX, &ossl_cipher_type, (ctx)); \
+} while (0)
#define GetCipher(obj, ctx) do { \
- Data_Get_Struct(obj, EVP_CIPHER_CTX, ctx); \
- if (!ctx) { \
- ossl_raise(rb_eRuntimeError, "Cipher not inititalized!"); \
+ GetCipherInit((obj), (ctx)); \
+ if (!(ctx)) { \
+ ossl_raise(rb_eRuntimeError, "Cipher not initialized!"); \
} \
} while (0)
-#define SafeGetCipher(obj, ctx) do { \
- OSSL_Check_Kind(obj, cCipher); \
- GetCipher(obj, ctx); \
-} while (0)
/*
* Classes
*/
-VALUE mCipher;
-VALUE cCipher;
-VALUE eCipherError;
+static VALUE cCipher;
+static VALUE eCipherError;
+static VALUE eAuthTagError;
+static ID id_auth_tag_len, id_key_set, id_cipher_holder;
static VALUE ossl_cipher_alloc(VALUE klass);
+static void ossl_cipher_free(void *ptr);
+
+static const rb_data_type_t ossl_cipher_type = {
+ "OpenSSL/Cipher",
+ {
+ 0, ossl_cipher_free,
+ },
+ 0, 0, RUBY_TYPED_FREE_IMMEDIATELY | RUBY_TYPED_WB_PROTECTED,
+};
+
+#ifdef OSSL_USE_PROVIDER
+static void
+ossl_evp_cipher_free(void *ptr)
+{
+ // This is safe to call against const EVP_CIPHER * returned by
+ // EVP_get_cipherbyname()
+ EVP_CIPHER_free(ptr);
+}
+
+static const rb_data_type_t ossl_evp_cipher_holder_type = {
+ "OpenSSL/EVP_CIPHER",
+ {
+ .dfree = ossl_evp_cipher_free,
+ },
+ 0, 0, RUBY_TYPED_FREE_IMMEDIATELY | RUBY_TYPED_WB_PROTECTED,
+};
+#endif
/*
* PUBLIC
*/
const EVP_CIPHER *
-GetCipherPtr(VALUE obj)
+ossl_evp_cipher_fetch(VALUE obj, volatile VALUE *holder)
{
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
-
- SafeGetCipher(obj, ctx);
+ *holder = Qnil;
+ if (rb_obj_is_kind_of(obj, cCipher)) {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+ GetCipher(obj, ctx);
+ EVP_CIPHER *cipher = (EVP_CIPHER *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx);
+#ifdef OSSL_USE_PROVIDER
+ *holder = TypedData_Wrap_Struct(0, &ossl_evp_cipher_holder_type, NULL);
+ if (!EVP_CIPHER_up_ref(cipher))
+ ossl_raise(eCipherError, "EVP_CIPHER_up_ref");
+ RTYPEDDATA_DATA(*holder) = cipher;
+#endif
+ return cipher;
+ }
- return EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx);
+ const char *name = StringValueCStr(obj);
+ EVP_CIPHER *cipher = (EVP_CIPHER *)EVP_get_cipherbyname(name);
+#ifdef OSSL_USE_PROVIDER
+ if (!cipher) {
+ ossl_clear_error();
+ *holder = TypedData_Wrap_Struct(0, &ossl_evp_cipher_holder_type, NULL);
+ cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(NULL, name, NULL);
+ RTYPEDDATA_DATA(*holder) = cipher;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (!cipher)
+ ossl_raise(eCipherError, "unsupported cipher algorithm: %"PRIsVALUE,
+ obj);
+ return cipher;
}
VALUE
@@ -51,11 +106,13 @@ ossl_cipher_new(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
VALUE ret;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+ // NOTE: This does not set id_cipher_holder because this function should
+ // only be called from ossl_engine.c, which will not use any
+ // reference-counted ciphers.
ret = ossl_cipher_alloc(cCipher);
- GetCipher(ret, ctx);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
- if (EVP_CipherInit(ctx, cipher, NULL, NULL, -1) != 1)
- ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
+ AllocCipher(ret, ctx);
+ if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, -1) != 1)
+ ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
return ret;
}
@@ -64,193 +121,322 @@ ossl_cipher_new(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
* PRIVATE
*/
static void
-ossl_cipher_free(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+ossl_cipher_free(void *ptr)
{
- if (ctx) {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
- free(ctx);
- }
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ptr);
}
static VALUE
ossl_cipher_alloc(VALUE klass)
{
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
- VALUE obj;
-
- MakeCipher(obj, klass, ctx);
-
- return obj;
+ return NewCipher(klass);
}
+/*
+ * call-seq:
+ * Cipher.new(string) -> cipher
+ *
+ * The string must contain a valid cipher name like "aes-256-cbc".
+ *
+ * A list of cipher names is available by calling OpenSSL::Cipher.ciphers.
+ */
static VALUE
ossl_cipher_initialize(VALUE self, VALUE str)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
- char *name;
-
- GetCipher(self, ctx);
+ VALUE cipher_holder;
- name = StringValuePtr(str);
-
- if (!(cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyname(name))) {
- ossl_raise(rb_eRuntimeError, "Unsupported cipher algorithm (%s).", name);
+ GetCipherInit(self, ctx);
+ if (ctx) {
+ ossl_raise(rb_eRuntimeError, "Cipher already initialized!");
}
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
- if (EVP_CipherInit(ctx, cipher, NULL, NULL, -1) != 1)
- ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
+ cipher = ossl_evp_cipher_fetch(str, &cipher_holder);
+ AllocCipher(self, ctx);
+ if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, -1) != 1)
+ ossl_raise(eCipherError, "EVP_CipherInit_ex");
+ rb_ivar_set(self, id_cipher_holder, cipher_holder);
return self;
}
+
+/* :nodoc: */
static VALUE
ossl_cipher_copy(VALUE self, VALUE other)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx1, *ctx2;
-
+
rb_check_frozen(self);
if (self == other) return self;
- GetCipher(self, ctx1);
- SafeGetCipher(other, ctx2);
-
- memcpy(ctx1, ctx2, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX));
+ GetCipherInit(self, ctx1);
+ if (!ctx1) {
+ AllocCipher(self, ctx1);
+ }
+ GetCipher(other, ctx2);
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy(ctx1, ctx2) != 1)
+ ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
return self;
}
+static void
+add_cipher_name_to_ary(const OBJ_NAME *name, void *arg)
+{
+ VALUE ary = (VALUE)arg;
+ rb_ary_push(ary, rb_str_new2(name->name));
+}
+
+/*
+ * call-seq:
+ * OpenSSL::Cipher.ciphers -> array[string...]
+ *
+ * Returns the names of all available ciphers in an array.
+ */
+static VALUE
+ossl_s_ciphers(VALUE self)
+{
+ VALUE ary;
+
+ ary = rb_ary_new();
+ OBJ_NAME_do_all_sorted(OBJ_NAME_TYPE_CIPHER_METH,
+ add_cipher_name_to_ary,
+ (void*)ary);
+
+ return ary;
+}
+
+/*
+ * call-seq:
+ * cipher.reset -> self
+ *
+ * Fully resets the internal state of the Cipher. By using this, the same
+ * Cipher instance may be used several times for encryption or decryption tasks.
+ *
+ * Internally calls EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, -1).
+ */
static VALUE
ossl_cipher_reset(VALUE self)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
GetCipher(self, ctx);
- if (EVP_CipherInit(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, -1) != 1)
- ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
-
+ if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, -1) != 1)
+ ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
+
return self;
}
static VALUE
-ossl_cipher_encrypt(int argc, VALUE *argv, VALUE self)
+ossl_cipher_init(VALUE self, int enc)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
- unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH], key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
- VALUE pass, init_v;
GetCipher(self, ctx);
-
- rb_scan_args(argc, argv, "02", &pass, &init_v);
-
- if (NIL_P(init_v)) {
- /*
- * TODO:
- * random IV generation!
- */
- memcpy(iv, "OpenSSL for Ruby rulez!", sizeof(iv));
- /*
- RAND_add(data,i,0); where from take data?
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 8) < 0) {
- ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
- }
- */
- }
- else {
- init_v = rb_obj_as_string(init_v);
- if (EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH > RSTRING(init_v)->len) {
- memset(iv, 0, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
- memcpy(iv, RSTRING(init_v)->ptr, RSTRING(init_v)->len);
- }
- else {
- memcpy(iv, RSTRING(init_v)->ptr, sizeof(iv));
- }
+ if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, enc) != 1) {
+ ossl_raise(eCipherError, "EVP_CipherInit_ex");
}
- if (EVP_CipherInit(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, 1) != 1) {
- ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
- }
+ rb_ivar_set(self, id_key_set, Qfalse);
- if (!NIL_P(pass)) {
- StringValue(pass);
+ return self;
+}
- EVP_BytesToKey(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx), EVP_md5(), iv,
- RSTRING(pass)->ptr, RSTRING(pass)->len, 1, key, NULL);
- if (EVP_CipherInit(ctx, NULL, key, iv, -1) != 1) {
- ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
- }
- }
+/*
+ * call-seq:
+ * cipher.encrypt -> self
+ *
+ * Initializes the Cipher for encryption.
+ *
+ * Make sure to call either #encrypt or #decrypt before using the Cipher for
+ * any operation or setting any parameters.
+ *
+ * Internally calls EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 1).
+ */
+static VALUE
+ossl_cipher_encrypt(VALUE self)
+{
+ return ossl_cipher_init(self, 1);
+}
- return self;
+/*
+ * call-seq:
+ * cipher.decrypt -> self
+ *
+ * Initializes the Cipher for decryption.
+ *
+ * Make sure to call either #encrypt or #decrypt before using the Cipher for
+ * any operation or setting any parameters.
+ *
+ * Internally calls EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0).
+ */
+static VALUE
+ossl_cipher_decrypt(VALUE self)
+{
+ return ossl_cipher_init(self, 0);
}
+/*
+ * call-seq:
+ * cipher.pkcs5_keyivgen(pass, salt = nil, iterations = 2048, digest = "MD5") -> nil
+ *
+ * Generates and sets the key/IV based on a password.
+ *
+ * *WARNING*: This method is deprecated and should not be used. This method
+ * corresponds to EVP_BytesToKey(), a non-standard OpenSSL extension of the
+ * legacy PKCS #5 v1.5 key derivation function. See OpenSSL::KDF for other
+ * options to derive keys from passwords.
+ *
+ * === Parameters
+ * * _salt_ must be an 8 byte string if provided.
+ * * _iterations_ is an integer with a default of 2048.
+ * * _digest_ is a Digest object that defaults to 'MD5'
+ */
static VALUE
-ossl_cipher_decrypt(int argc, VALUE *argv, VALUE self)
+ossl_cipher_pkcs5_keyivgen(int argc, VALUE *argv, VALUE self)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
- unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH], key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
- VALUE pass, init_v;
-
- GetCipher(self, ctx);
- rb_scan_args(argc, argv, "02", &pass, &init_v);
-
- if (NIL_P(init_v)) {
- /*
- * TODO:
- * random IV generation!
- */
- memcpy(iv, "OpenSSL for Ruby rulez!", EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
+ const EVP_MD *digest;
+ VALUE vpass, vsalt, viter, vdigest, md_holder;
+ unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH], iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH], *salt = NULL;
+ int iter;
+
+ rb_scan_args(argc, argv, "13", &vpass, &vsalt, &viter, &vdigest);
+ StringValue(vpass);
+ if(!NIL_P(vsalt)){
+ StringValue(vsalt);
+ if(RSTRING_LEN(vsalt) != PKCS5_SALT_LEN)
+ ossl_raise(eCipherError, "salt must be an 8-octet string");
+ salt = (unsigned char *)RSTRING_PTR(vsalt);
}
- else {
- init_v = rb_obj_as_string(init_v);
- if (EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH > RSTRING(init_v)->len) {
- memset(iv, 0, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
- memcpy(iv, RSTRING(init_v)->ptr, RSTRING(init_v)->len);
- }
- else {
- memcpy(iv, RSTRING(init_v)->ptr, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
- }
- }
-
- if (EVP_CipherInit(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0) != 1) {
+ iter = NIL_P(viter) ? 2048 : NUM2INT(viter);
+ if (iter <= 0)
+ rb_raise(rb_eArgError, "iterations must be a positive integer");
+ digest = NIL_P(vdigest) ? EVP_md5() : ossl_evp_md_fetch(vdigest, &md_holder);
+ GetCipher(self, ctx);
+ EVP_BytesToKey(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx), digest, salt,
+ (unsigned char *)RSTRING_PTR(vpass), RSTRING_LENINT(vpass), iter, key, iv);
+ if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, iv, -1) != 1)
ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
- }
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(key, sizeof key);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(iv, sizeof iv);
- if (!NIL_P(pass)) {
- StringValue(pass);
+ rb_ivar_set(self, id_key_set, Qtrue);
- EVP_BytesToKey(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx), EVP_md5(), iv,
- RSTRING(pass)->ptr, RSTRING(pass)->len, 1, key, NULL);
- if (EVP_CipherInit(ctx, NULL, key, iv, -1) != 1) {
- ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
- }
- }
+ return Qnil;
+}
- return self;
+static int
+ossl_cipher_update_long(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, long *out_len_ptr,
+ const unsigned char *in, long in_len)
+{
+ int out_part_len;
+ int limit = INT_MAX / 2 + 1;
+ long out_len = 0;
+
+ do {
+ int in_part_len = in_len > limit ? limit : (int)in_len;
+
+ if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, out ? (out + out_len) : 0,
+ &out_part_len, in, in_part_len))
+ return 0;
+
+ out_len += out_part_len;
+ in += in_part_len;
+ } while ((in_len -= limit) > 0);
+
+ if (out_len_ptr)
+ *out_len_ptr = out_len;
+
+ return 1;
}
-static VALUE
-ossl_cipher_update(VALUE self, VALUE data)
+/*
+ * call-seq:
+ * cipher.update(data [, buffer]) -> string or buffer
+ *
+ * Encrypts data in a streaming fashion. Hand consecutive blocks of data
+ * to the #update method in order to encrypt it. Returns the encrypted
+ * data chunk. When done, the output of Cipher#final should be additionally
+ * added to the result.
+ *
+ * If _buffer_ is given, the encryption/decryption result will be written to
+ * it. _buffer_ will be resized automatically.
+ *
+ * *NOTE*: When decrypting using an AEAD cipher, the integrity of the output
+ * is not verified until #final has been called.
+ */
+static VALUE
+ossl_cipher_update(int argc, VALUE *argv, VALUE self)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
- char *in;
- int in_len, out_len;
- VALUE str;
+ unsigned char *in;
+ long in_len, out_len;
+ VALUE data, str;
+
+ rb_scan_args(argc, argv, "11", &data, &str);
+
+ if (!RTEST(rb_attr_get(self, id_key_set)))
+ ossl_raise(eCipherError, "key not set");
- GetCipher(self, ctx);
StringValue(data);
- in = RSTRING(data)->ptr;
- in_len = RSTRING(data)->len;
- str = rb_str_new(0, in_len+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx));
- if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, RSTRING(str)->ptr, &out_len, in, in_len))
- ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
- assert(out_len < RSTRING(str)->len);
- RSTRING(str)->len = out_len;
- RSTRING(str)->ptr[out_len] = 0;
+ in = (unsigned char *)RSTRING_PTR(data);
+ in_len = RSTRING_LEN(data);
+ GetCipher(self, ctx);
+
+ /*
+ * As of OpenSSL 3.2, there is no reliable way to determine the required
+ * output buffer size for arbitrary cipher modes.
+ * https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/22628
+ *
+ * in_len+block_size is usually sufficient, but AES key wrap with padding
+ * ciphers require in_len+15 even though they have a block size of 8 bytes.
+ *
+ * Using EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH (32) as a safe upper bound for ciphers
+ * currently implemented in OpenSSL, but this can change in the future.
+ */
+ if (in_len > LONG_MAX - EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
+ ossl_raise(rb_eRangeError,
+ "data too big to make output buffer: %ld bytes", in_len);
+ }
+ out_len = in_len + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+
+ if (NIL_P(str))
+ str = rb_str_buf_new(out_len);
+ else {
+ StringValue(str);
+ if ((long)rb_str_capacity(str) >= out_len)
+ rb_str_modify(str);
+ else
+ rb_str_modify_expand(str, out_len - RSTRING_LEN(str));
+ }
+
+ if (!ossl_cipher_update_long(ctx, (unsigned char *)RSTRING_PTR(str),
+ &out_len, in, in_len))
+ ossl_raise(eCipherError, "EVP_CipherUpdate");
+ rb_str_set_len(str, out_len);
return str;
}
-static VALUE
+/*
+ * call-seq:
+ * cipher.final -> string
+ *
+ * Returns the remaining data held in the cipher object. Further calls to
+ * Cipher#update or Cipher#final are invalid. This call should always
+ * be made as the last call of an encryption or decryption operation, after
+ * having fed the entire plaintext or ciphertext to the Cipher instance.
+ *
+ * When encrypting using an AEAD cipher, the authentication tag can be
+ * retrieved by #auth_tag after #final has been called.
+ *
+ * When decrypting using an AEAD cipher, this method will verify the integrity
+ * of the ciphertext and the associated data with the authentication tag,
+ * which must be set by #auth_tag= prior to calling this method.
+ * If the verification fails, CipherError will be raised.
+ */
+static VALUE
ossl_cipher_final(VALUE self)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
@@ -259,15 +445,29 @@ ossl_cipher_final(VALUE self)
GetCipher(self, ctx);
str = rb_str_new(0, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx));
- if (!EVP_CipherFinal(ctx, RSTRING(str)->ptr, &out_len))
- ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
- assert(out_len <= RSTRING(str)->len);
- RSTRING(str)->len = out_len;
- RSTRING(str)->ptr[out_len] = 0;
+ if (!EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx, (unsigned char *)RSTRING_PTR(str), &out_len)) {
+ /* For AEAD ciphers, this is likely an authentication failure */
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) {
+ /* For AEAD ciphers, EVP_CipherFinal_ex failures are authentication tag verification failures */
+ ossl_raise(eAuthTagError, "AEAD authentication tag verification failed");
+ }
+ else {
+ /* For non-AEAD ciphers */
+ ossl_raise(eCipherError, "cipher final failed");
+ }
+ }
+ rb_str_set_len(str, out_len);
return str;
}
+/*
+ * call-seq:
+ * cipher.name -> string
+ *
+ * Returns the short name of the cipher which may differ slightly from the
+ * original name provided.
+ */
static VALUE
ossl_cipher_name(VALUE self)
{
@@ -278,105 +478,660 @@ ossl_cipher_name(VALUE self)
return rb_str_new2(EVP_CIPHER_name(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx)));
}
+/*
+ * call-seq:
+ * cipher.key = string
+ *
+ * Sets the cipher key. To generate a key, you should either use a secure
+ * random byte string or, if the key is to be derived from a password, you
+ * should rely on PBKDF2 functionality provided by OpenSSL::PKCS5. To
+ * generate a secure random-based key, Cipher#random_key may be used.
+ *
+ * Only call this method after calling Cipher#encrypt or Cipher#decrypt.
+ *
+ * See also the man page EVP_CipherInit_ex(3).
+ */
static VALUE
ossl_cipher_set_key(VALUE self, VALUE key)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+ int key_len;
StringValue(key);
GetCipher(self, ctx);
- if (RSTRING(key)->len < EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx))
- ossl_raise(eCipherError, "key length too short");
+ key_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+ if (RSTRING_LEN(key) != key_len)
+ ossl_raise(rb_eArgError, "key must be %d bytes", key_len);
- if (EVP_CipherInit(ctx, NULL, RSTRING(key)->ptr, NULL, -1) != 1)
+ if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, (unsigned char *)RSTRING_PTR(key), NULL, -1) != 1)
ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
+ rb_ivar_set(self, id_key_set, Qtrue);
+
return key;
}
+/*
+ * call-seq:
+ * cipher.iv = string
+ *
+ * Sets the cipher IV. Please note that since you should never be using ECB
+ * mode, an IV is always explicitly required and should be set prior to
+ * encryption. The IV itself can be safely transmitted in public.
+ *
+ * This method expects the String to have the length equal to #iv_len. To use
+ * a different IV length with an AEAD cipher, #iv_len= must be set prior to
+ * calling this method.
+ *
+ * *NOTE*: In OpenSSL API conventions, the IV value may correspond to the
+ * "nonce" instead in some cipher modes. Refer to the OpenSSL man pages for
+ * details.
+ *
+ * See also the man page EVP_CipherInit_ex(3).
+ */
static VALUE
ossl_cipher_set_iv(VALUE self, VALUE iv)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+ int iv_len = 0;
StringValue(iv);
GetCipher(self, ctx);
- if (RSTRING(iv)->len < EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx))
- ossl_raise(eCipherError, "iv length too short");
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)
+ iv_len = (int)(VALUE)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx);
+ if (!iv_len)
+ iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
+ if (RSTRING_LEN(iv) != iv_len)
+ ossl_raise(rb_eArgError, "iv must be %d bytes", iv_len);
- if (EVP_CipherInit(ctx, NULL, NULL, RSTRING(iv)->ptr, -1) != 1)
- ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
+ if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, (unsigned char *)RSTRING_PTR(iv), -1) != 1)
+ ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
return iv;
}
+/*
+ * call-seq:
+ * cipher.authenticated? -> true | false
+ *
+ * Indicates whether this Cipher instance uses an AEAD mode.
+ */
static VALUE
-ossl_cipher_set_padding(VALUE self, VALUE padding)
+ossl_cipher_is_authenticated(VALUE self)
{
-#if defined(HAVE_ST_FLAGS)
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
GetCipher(self, ctx);
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, NUM2INT(padding)) != 1)
- ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
-#else
- rb_notimplement();
-#endif
+ return (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) ? Qtrue : Qfalse;
+}
+
+/*
+ * call-seq:
+ * cipher.auth_data = string
+ *
+ * Sets additional authenticated data (AAD), also called associated data, for
+ * this Cipher. This method is available for AEAD ciphers.
+ *
+ * The contents of this field should be non-sensitive data which will be
+ * added to the ciphertext to generate the authentication tag which validates
+ * the contents of the ciphertext.
+ *
+ * This method must be called after #key= and #iv= have been set, but before
+ * starting actual encryption or decryption with #update. In some cipher modes,
+ * #auth_tag_len= and #ccm_data_len= may also need to be called before this
+ * method.
+ *
+ * See also the "AEAD Interface" section of the man page EVP_EncryptInit(3).
+ * This method internally calls EVP_CipherUpdate() with the output buffer
+ * set to NULL.
+ */
+static VALUE
+ossl_cipher_set_auth_data(VALUE self, VALUE data)
+{
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+ unsigned char *in;
+ long in_len, out_len;
+
+ StringValue(data);
+
+ in = (unsigned char *) RSTRING_PTR(data);
+ in_len = RSTRING_LEN(data);
+
+ GetCipher(self, ctx);
+ if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER))
+ ossl_raise(eCipherError, "AEAD not supported by this cipher");
+
+ if (!ossl_cipher_update_long(ctx, NULL, &out_len, in, in_len))
+ ossl_raise(eCipherError, "couldn't set additional authenticated data");
+
+ return data;
+}
+
+/*
+ * call-seq:
+ * cipher.auth_tag(tag_len = 16) -> String
+ *
+ * Gets the generated authentication tag. This method is available for AEAD
+ * ciphers, and should be called after encryption has been finalized by calling
+ * #final.
+ *
+ * The returned tag will be _tag_len_ bytes long. Some cipher modes require
+ * the desired length in advance using a separate call to #auth_tag_len=,
+ * before starting encryption.
+ *
+ * See also the "AEAD Interface" section of the man page EVP_EncryptInit(3).
+ * This method internally calls EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl() with
+ * EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG.
+ */
+static VALUE
+ossl_cipher_get_auth_tag(int argc, VALUE *argv, VALUE self)
+{
+ VALUE vtag_len, ret;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+ int tag_len = 16;
+
+ rb_scan_args(argc, argv, "01", &vtag_len);
+ if (NIL_P(vtag_len))
+ vtag_len = rb_attr_get(self, id_auth_tag_len);
+ if (!NIL_P(vtag_len))
+ tag_len = NUM2INT(vtag_len);
+
+ GetCipher(self, ctx);
+
+ if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER))
+ ossl_raise(eCipherError, "authentication tag not supported by this cipher");
+
+ ret = rb_str_new(NULL, tag_len);
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG, tag_len, RSTRING_PTR(ret)) <= 0)
+ ossl_raise(eCipherError, "retrieving the authentication tag failed");
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * call-seq:
+ * cipher.auth_tag = string
+ *
+ * Sets the authentication tag to verify the integrity of the ciphertext.
+ *
+ * The authentication tag must be set before #final is called. The tag is
+ * verified during the #final call.
+ *
+ * Note that, for CCM mode and OCB mode, the expected length of the tag must
+ * be set before starting decryption by a separate call to #auth_tag_len=.
+ * The content of the tag can be provided at any time before #final is called.
+ *
+ * *NOTE*: The caller must ensure that the String passed to this method has
+ * the desired length. Some cipher modes support variable tag lengths, and
+ * this method may accept a truncated tag without raising an exception.
+ *
+ * See also the "AEAD Interface" section of the man page EVP_EncryptInit(3).
+ * This method internally calls EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl() with
+ * EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG.
+ */
+static VALUE
+ossl_cipher_set_auth_tag(VALUE self, VALUE vtag)
+{
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+ unsigned char *tag;
+ int tag_len;
+
+ StringValue(vtag);
+ tag = (unsigned char *) RSTRING_PTR(vtag);
+ tag_len = RSTRING_LENINT(vtag);
+
+ GetCipher(self, ctx);
+ if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER))
+ ossl_raise(eCipherError, "authentication tag not supported by this cipher");
+
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, tag_len, tag) <= 0)
+ ossl_raise(eCipherError, "unable to set AEAD tag");
+
+ return vtag;
+}
+
+/*
+ * call-seq:
+ * cipher.auth_tag_len = integer
+ *
+ * Sets the length of the expected authentication tag for this Cipher. This
+ * method is available for some of AEAD ciphers that require the length to be
+ * set before starting encryption or decryption, such as CCM mode or OCB mode.
+ *
+ * For CCM mode and OCB mode, the tag length must be set before #iv= is set.
+ *
+ * See also the "AEAD Interface" section of the man page EVP_EncryptInit(3).
+ * This method internally calls EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl() with
+ * EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG and a NULL buffer.
+ */
+static VALUE
+ossl_cipher_set_auth_tag_len(VALUE self, VALUE vlen)
+{
+ int tag_len = NUM2INT(vlen);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+
+ GetCipher(self, ctx);
+ if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER))
+ ossl_raise(eCipherError, "AEAD not supported by this cipher");
+
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, tag_len, NULL) <= 0)
+ ossl_raise(eCipherError, "unable to set authentication tag length");
+
+ /* for #auth_tag */
+ rb_ivar_set(self, id_auth_tag_len, INT2NUM(tag_len));
+
+ return vlen;
+}
+
+/*
+ * call-seq:
+ * cipher.iv_len = integer
+ *
+ * Sets the IV/nonce length for this Cipher. This method is available for AEAD
+ * ciphers that support variable IV lengths. This method can be called if a
+ * different IV length than OpenSSL's default is desired, prior to calling
+ * #iv=.
+ *
+ * See also the "AEAD Interface" section of the man page EVP_EncryptInit(3).
+ * This method internally calls EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl() with
+ * EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN.
+ */
+static VALUE
+ossl_cipher_set_iv_length(VALUE self, VALUE iv_length)
+{
+ int len = NUM2INT(iv_length);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+
+ GetCipher(self, ctx);
+ if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER))
+ ossl_raise(eCipherError, "cipher does not support AEAD");
+
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, len, NULL) <= 0)
+ ossl_raise(eCipherError, "unable to set IV length");
+
+ /*
+ * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length() returns the default length. So we need to save
+ * the length somewhere. Luckily currently we aren't using app_data.
+ */
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, (void *)(VALUE)len);
+
+ return iv_length;
+}
+
+/*
+ * call-seq:
+ * cipher.key_len = integer
+ *
+ * Sets the key length of the cipher. If the cipher is a fixed length cipher
+ * then attempting to set the key length to any value other than the fixed
+ * value is an error.
+ *
+ * Under normal circumstances you do not need to call this method (and
+ * probably shouldn't).
+ *
+ * See EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length for further information.
+ */
+static VALUE
+ossl_cipher_set_key_length(VALUE self, VALUE key_length)
+{
+ int len = NUM2INT(key_length);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+
+ GetCipher(self, ctx);
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, len) != 1)
+ ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
+
+ return key_length;
+}
+
+// TODO: Should #padding= take a boolean value instead?
+/*
+ * call-seq:
+ * cipher.padding = 1 or 0
+ *
+ * Enables or disables padding. By default encryption operations are padded
+ * using standard block padding and the padding is checked and removed when
+ * decrypting. If the pad parameter is zero then no padding is performed, the
+ * total amount of data encrypted or decrypted must then be a multiple of the
+ * block size or an error will occur.
+ *
+ * See EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding for further information.
+ */
+static VALUE
+ossl_cipher_set_padding(VALUE self, VALUE padding)
+{
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+ int pad = NUM2INT(padding);
+
+ GetCipher(self, ctx);
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, pad) != 1)
+ ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
return padding;
}
-#define CIPHER_0ARG_INT(func) \
- static VALUE \
- ossl_cipher_##func(VALUE self) \
- { \
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; \
- GetCipher(self, ctx); \
- return INT2NUM(EVP_CIPHER_##func(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx))); \
- }
-CIPHER_0ARG_INT(key_length)
-CIPHER_0ARG_INT(iv_length)
-CIPHER_0ARG_INT(block_size)
+/*
+ * call-seq:
+ * cipher.key_len -> integer
+ *
+ * Returns the key length in bytes of the Cipher.
+ */
+static VALUE
+ossl_cipher_key_length(VALUE self)
+{
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+
+ GetCipher(self, ctx);
+
+ return INT2NUM(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx));
+}
+
+/*
+ * call-seq:
+ * cipher.iv_len -> integer
+ *
+ * Returns the expected length in bytes for an IV for this Cipher.
+ */
+static VALUE
+ossl_cipher_iv_length(VALUE self)
+{
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+ int len = 0;
+
+ GetCipher(self, ctx);
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)
+ len = (int)(VALUE)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx);
+ if (!len)
+ len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
+
+ return INT2NUM(len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * call-seq:
+ * cipher.block_size -> integer
+ *
+ * Returns the size in bytes of the blocks on which this Cipher operates on.
+ */
+static VALUE
+ossl_cipher_block_size(VALUE self)
+{
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+
+ GetCipher(self, ctx);
+
+ return INT2NUM(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx));
+}
+
+/*
+ * call-seq:
+ * cipher.ccm_data_len = integer
+ *
+ * Sets the total length of the plaintext / ciphertext message that will be
+ * processed by #update in CCM mode.
+ *
+ * Make sure to call this method after #key= and #iv= have been set, and
+ * before #auth_data= or #update are called.
+ *
+ * This method is only available for CCM mode ciphers.
+ *
+ * See also the "AEAD Interface" section of the man page EVP_EncryptInit(3).
+ */
+static VALUE
+ossl_cipher_set_ccm_data_len(VALUE self, VALUE data_len)
+{
+ int in_len, out_len;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+
+ in_len = NUM2INT(data_len);
+
+ GetCipher(self, ctx);
+ if (EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, NULL, &out_len, NULL, in_len) != 1)
+ ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
+
+ return data_len;
+}
/*
* INIT
*/
-void
+void
Init_ossl_cipher(void)
{
- mCipher = rb_define_module_under(mOSSL, "Cipher");
- eCipherError = rb_define_class_under(mOSSL, "CipherError", eOSSLError);
- cCipher = rb_define_class_under(mCipher, "Cipher", rb_cObject);
+ /* Document-class: OpenSSL::Cipher
+ *
+ * Provides symmetric algorithms for encryption and decryption. The
+ * algorithms that are available depend on the particular version
+ * of OpenSSL that is installed.
+ *
+ * === Listing all supported algorithms
+ *
+ * A list of supported algorithms can be obtained by
+ *
+ * puts OpenSSL::Cipher.ciphers
+ *
+ * === Instantiating a Cipher
+ *
+ * There are several ways to create a Cipher instance. Generally, a
+ * Cipher algorithm is categorized by its name, the key length in bits
+ * and the cipher mode to be used. The most generic way to create a
+ * Cipher is the following
+ *
+ * cipher = OpenSSL::Cipher.new('<name>-<key length>-<mode>')
+ *
+ * That is, a string consisting of the hyphenated concatenation of the
+ * individual components name, key length and mode. Either all uppercase
+ * or all lowercase strings may be used, for example:
+ *
+ * cipher = OpenSSL::Cipher.new('aes-128-cbc')
+ *
+ * === Choosing either encryption or decryption mode
+ *
+ * Encryption and decryption are often very similar operations for
+ * symmetric algorithms, this is reflected by not having to choose
+ * different classes for either operation, both can be done using the
+ * same class. Still, after obtaining a Cipher instance, we need to
+ * tell the instance what it is that we intend to do with it, so we
+ * need to call either
+ *
+ * cipher.encrypt
+ *
+ * or
+ *
+ * cipher.decrypt
+ *
+ * on the Cipher instance. This should be the first call after creating
+ * the instance, otherwise configuration that has already been set could
+ * get lost in the process.
+ *
+ * === Choosing a key
+ *
+ * Symmetric encryption requires a key that is the same for the encrypting
+ * and for the decrypting party and after initial key establishment should
+ * be kept as private information. There are a lot of ways to create
+ * insecure keys, the most notable is to simply take a password as the key
+ * without processing the password further. A simple and secure way to
+ * create a key for a particular Cipher is
+ *
+ * cipher = OpenSSL::Cipher.new('aes-256-cfb')
+ * cipher.encrypt
+ * key = cipher.random_key # also sets the generated key on the Cipher
+ *
+ * If you absolutely need to use passwords as encryption keys, you
+ * should use Password-Based Key Derivation Function 2 (PBKDF2) by
+ * generating the key with the help of the functionality provided by
+ * OpenSSL::PKCS5.pbkdf2_hmac_sha1 or OpenSSL::PKCS5.pbkdf2_hmac.
+ *
+ * Although there is Cipher#pkcs5_keyivgen, its use is deprecated and
+ * it should only be used in legacy applications because it does not use
+ * the newer PKCS#5 v2 algorithms.
+ *
+ * === Choosing an IV
+ *
+ * The cipher modes CBC, CFB, OFB and CTR all need an "initialization
+ * vector", or short, IV. ECB mode is the only mode that does not require
+ * an IV, but there is almost no legitimate use case for this mode
+ * because of the fact that it does not sufficiently hide plaintext
+ * patterns. Therefore
+ *
+ * <b>You should never use ECB mode unless you are absolutely sure that
+ * you absolutely need it</b>
+ *
+ * Because of this, you will end up with a mode that explicitly requires
+ * an IV in any case. Although the IV can be seen as public information,
+ * i.e. it may be transmitted in public once generated, it should still
+ * stay unpredictable to prevent certain kinds of attacks. Therefore,
+ * ideally
+ *
+ * <b>Always create a secure random IV for every encryption of your
+ * Cipher</b>
+ *
+ * A new, random IV should be created for every encryption of data. Think
+ * of the IV as a nonce (number used once) - it's public but random and
+ * unpredictable. A secure random IV can be created as follows
+ *
+ * cipher = ...
+ * cipher.encrypt
+ * key = cipher.random_key
+ * iv = cipher.random_iv # also sets the generated IV on the Cipher
+ *
+ * Although the key is generally a random value, too, it is a bad choice
+ * as an IV. There are elaborate ways how an attacker can take advantage
+ * of such an IV. As a general rule of thumb, exposing the key directly
+ * or indirectly should be avoided at all cost and exceptions only be
+ * made with good reason.
+ *
+ * === Calling Cipher#final
+ *
+ * ECB (which should not be used) and CBC are both block-based modes.
+ * This means that unlike for the other streaming-based modes, they
+ * operate on fixed-size blocks of data, and therefore they require a
+ * "finalization" step to produce or correctly decrypt the last block of
+ * data by appropriately handling some form of padding. Therefore it is
+ * essential to add the output of OpenSSL::Cipher#final to your
+ * encryption/decryption buffer or you will end up with decryption errors
+ * or truncated data.
+ *
+ * Although this is not really necessary for streaming-mode ciphers, it is
+ * still recommended to apply the same pattern of adding the output of
+ * Cipher#final there as well - it also enables you to switch between
+ * modes more easily in the future.
+ *
+ * === Encrypting and decrypting some data
+ *
+ * data = "Very, very confidential data"
+ *
+ * cipher = OpenSSL::Cipher.new('aes-128-cbc')
+ * cipher.encrypt
+ * key = cipher.random_key
+ * iv = cipher.random_iv
+ *
+ * encrypted = cipher.update(data) + cipher.final
+ * ...
+ * decipher = OpenSSL::Cipher.new('aes-128-cbc')
+ * decipher.decrypt
+ * decipher.key = key
+ * decipher.iv = iv
+ *
+ * plain = decipher.update(encrypted) + decipher.final
+ *
+ * puts data == plain #=> true
+ *
+ * === Authenticated Encryption and Associated Data (AEAD)
+ *
+ * If the OpenSSL version used supports it, an Authenticated Encryption
+ * mode (such as GCM or CCM) should always be preferred over any
+ * unauthenticated mode. Currently, OpenSSL supports AE only in combination
+ * with Associated Data (AEAD) where additional associated data is included
+ * in the encryption process to compute a tag at the end of the encryption.
+ * This tag will also be used in the decryption process and by verifying
+ * its validity, the authenticity of a given ciphertext is established.
+ *
+ * This is superior to unauthenticated modes in that it allows to detect
+ * if somebody effectively changed the ciphertext after it had been
+ * encrypted. This prevents malicious modifications of the ciphertext that
+ * could otherwise be exploited to modify ciphertexts in ways beneficial to
+ * potential attackers.
+ *
+ * Associated data, also called additional authenticated data (AAD), is
+ * optionally used where there is additional information, such as
+ * headers or some metadata, that must be also authenticated but not
+ * necessarily need to be encrypted.
+ *
+ * An example using the GCM (Galois/Counter Mode). You have 16 bytes _key_,
+ * 12 bytes (96 bits) _nonce_ and the associated data _auth_data_. Be sure
+ * not to reuse the _key_ and _nonce_ pair. Reusing an nonce ruins the
+ * security guarantees of GCM mode.
+ *
+ * key = OpenSSL::Random.random_bytes(16)
+ * nonce = OpenSSL::Random.random_bytes(12)
+ * auth_data = "authenticated but unencrypted data"
+ * data = "encrypted data"
+ *
+ * cipher = OpenSSL::Cipher.new('aes-128-gcm').encrypt
+ * cipher.key = key
+ * cipher.iv = nonce
+ * cipher.auth_data = auth_data
+ *
+ * encrypted = cipher.update(data) + cipher.final
+ * tag = cipher.auth_tag(16)
+ *
+ * Now you are the receiver. You know the _key_ and have received _nonce_,
+ * _auth_data_, _encrypted_ and _tag_ through an untrusted network. Note
+ * that GCM accepts an arbitrary length tag between 1 and 16 bytes. You may
+ * additionally need to check that the received tag has the correct length,
+ * or you allow attackers to forge a valid single byte tag for the tampered
+ * ciphertext with a probability of 1/256.
+ *
+ * raise "tag is truncated!" unless tag.bytesize == 16
+ * decipher = OpenSSL::Cipher.new('aes-128-gcm').decrypt
+ * decipher.key = key
+ * decipher.iv = nonce
+ * decipher.auth_tag = tag # could be called at any time before #final
+ * decipher.auth_data = auth_data
+ *
+ * decrypted = decipher.update(encrypted) + decipher.final
+ *
+ * puts data == decrypted #=> true
+ *
+ * Note that other AEAD ciphers may require additional steps, such as
+ * setting the expected tag length (#auth_tag_len=) or the total data
+ * length (#ccm_data_len=) in advance. Make sure to read the relevant man
+ * page for details.
+ */
+ cCipher = rb_define_class_under(mOSSL, "Cipher", rb_cObject);
+ eCipherError = rb_define_class_under(cCipher, "CipherError", eOSSLError);
+ eAuthTagError = rb_define_class_under(cCipher, "AuthTagError", eCipherError);
rb_define_alloc_func(cCipher, ossl_cipher_alloc);
+ rb_define_method(cCipher, "initialize_copy", ossl_cipher_copy, 1);
+ rb_define_module_function(cCipher, "ciphers", ossl_s_ciphers, 0);
rb_define_method(cCipher, "initialize", ossl_cipher_initialize, 1);
-
- rb_define_copy_func(cCipher, ossl_cipher_copy);
-
rb_define_method(cCipher, "reset", ossl_cipher_reset, 0);
-
- rb_define_method(cCipher, "encrypt", ossl_cipher_encrypt, -1);
- rb_define_method(cCipher, "decrypt", ossl_cipher_decrypt, -1);
- rb_define_method(cCipher, "update", ossl_cipher_update, 1);
- rb_define_alias(cCipher, "<<", "update");
+ rb_define_method(cCipher, "encrypt", ossl_cipher_encrypt, 0);
+ rb_define_method(cCipher, "decrypt", ossl_cipher_decrypt, 0);
+ rb_define_method(cCipher, "pkcs5_keyivgen", ossl_cipher_pkcs5_keyivgen, -1);
+ rb_define_method(cCipher, "update", ossl_cipher_update, -1);
rb_define_method(cCipher, "final", ossl_cipher_final, 0);
-
rb_define_method(cCipher, "name", ossl_cipher_name, 0);
-
rb_define_method(cCipher, "key=", ossl_cipher_set_key, 1);
+ rb_define_method(cCipher, "auth_data=", ossl_cipher_set_auth_data, 1);
+ rb_define_method(cCipher, "auth_tag=", ossl_cipher_set_auth_tag, 1);
+ rb_define_method(cCipher, "auth_tag", ossl_cipher_get_auth_tag, -1);
+ rb_define_method(cCipher, "auth_tag_len=", ossl_cipher_set_auth_tag_len, 1);
+ rb_define_method(cCipher, "authenticated?", ossl_cipher_is_authenticated, 0);
+ rb_define_method(cCipher, "key_len=", ossl_cipher_set_key_length, 1);
rb_define_method(cCipher, "key_len", ossl_cipher_key_length, 0);
-/*
- * TODO
- * int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *x, int keylen);
- */
rb_define_method(cCipher, "iv=", ossl_cipher_set_iv, 1);
+ rb_define_method(cCipher, "iv_len=", ossl_cipher_set_iv_length, 1);
rb_define_method(cCipher, "iv_len", ossl_cipher_iv_length, 0);
-
rb_define_method(cCipher, "block_size", ossl_cipher_block_size, 0);
-
rb_define_method(cCipher, "padding=", ossl_cipher_set_padding, 1);
+ rb_define_method(cCipher, "ccm_data_len=", ossl_cipher_set_ccm_data_len, 1);
-} /* Init_ossl_cipher */
-
+ id_auth_tag_len = rb_intern_const("auth_tag_len");
+ id_key_set = rb_intern_const("key_set");
+ id_cipher_holder = rb_intern_const("EVP_CIPHER_holder");
+}