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authornobu <nobu@b2dd03c8-39d4-4d8f-98ff-823fe69b080e>2019-03-20 01:17:16 +0000
committernobu <nobu@b2dd03c8-39d4-4d8f-98ff-823fe69b080e>2019-03-20 01:17:16 +0000
commita265141c84f5b62d3dce62db1cf47d0c88dce601 (patch)
tree6e8ac2b1b72b10bb61b24ece9ee09fe5b45e7b77 /string.c
parenteee58ca61134447e2f2140f9bf5366dc1495d7fe (diff)
string.c: [DOC] fix indent [ci skip]
* string.c (rb_str_crypt): fix indent not to make the whole list verbatim entirely. git-svn-id: svn+ssh://ci.ruby-lang.org/ruby/trunk@67310 b2dd03c8-39d4-4d8f-98ff-823fe69b080e
Diffstat (limited to 'string.c')
-rw-r--r--string.c86
1 files changed, 43 insertions, 43 deletions
diff --git a/string.c b/string.c
index 449fb558db..5f5058a961 100644
--- a/string.c
+++ b/string.c
@@ -9219,49 +9219,49 @@ rb_str_oct(VALUE str)
* backward compatibility with ruby scripts in earlier days. It is
* bad to use in contemporary programs for several reasons:
*
- * * Behaviour of C's <code>crypt(3)</code> depends on the OS it is
- * run. The generated string lacks data portability.
- *
- * * On some OSes such as Mac OS, <code>crypt(3)</code> never fails
- * (i.e. silently ends up in unexpected results).
- *
- * * On some OSes such as Mac OS, <code>crypt(3)</code> is not
- * thread safe.
- *
- * * So-called "traditional" usage of <code>crypt(3)</code> is very
- * very very weak. According to its manpage, Linux's traditional
- * <code>crypt(3)</code> output has only 2**56 variations; too
- * easy to brute force today. And this is the default behaviour.
- *
- * * In order to make things robust some OSes implement so-called
- * "modular" usage. To go through, you have to do a complex
- * build-up of the <code>salt_str</code> parameter, by hand.
- * Failure in generation of a proper salt string tends not to
- * yield any errors; typos in parameters are normally not
- * detectable.
- *
- * * For instance, in the following example, the second invocation
- * of <code>String#crypt</code> is wrong; it has a typo in
- * "round=" (lacks "s"). However the call does not fail and
- * something unexpected is generated.
- *
- * "foo".crypt("$5$rounds=1000$salt$") # OK, proper usage
- * "foo".crypt("$5$round=1000$salt$") # Typo not detected
- *
- * * Even in the "modular" mode, some hash functions are considered
- * archaic and no longer recommended at all; for instance module
- * <code>$1$</code> is officially abandoned by its author: see
- * http://phk.freebsd.dk/sagas/md5crypt_eol.html . For another
- * instance module <code>$3$</code> is considered completely
- * broken: see the manpage of FreeBSD.
- *
- * * On some OS such as Mac OS, there is no modular mode. Yet, as
- * written above, <code>crypt(3)</code> on Mac OS never fails.
- * This means even if you build up a proper salt string it
- * generates a traditional DES hash anyways, and there is no way
- * for you to be aware of.
- *
- * "foo".crypt("$5$rounds=1000$salt$") # => "$5fNPQMxC5j6."
+ * * Behaviour of C's <code>crypt(3)</code> depends on the OS it is
+ * run. The generated string lacks data portability.
+ *
+ * * On some OSes such as Mac OS, <code>crypt(3)</code> never fails
+ * (i.e. silently ends up in unexpected results).
+ *
+ * * On some OSes such as Mac OS, <code>crypt(3)</code> is not
+ * thread safe.
+ *
+ * * So-called "traditional" usage of <code>crypt(3)</code> is very
+ * very very weak. According to its manpage, Linux's traditional
+ * <code>crypt(3)</code> output has only 2**56 variations; too
+ * easy to brute force today. And this is the default behaviour.
+ *
+ * * In order to make things robust some OSes implement so-called
+ * "modular" usage. To go through, you have to do a complex
+ * build-up of the <code>salt_str</code> parameter, by hand.
+ * Failure in generation of a proper salt string tends not to
+ * yield any errors; typos in parameters are normally not
+ * detectable.
+ *
+ * * For instance, in the following example, the second invocation
+ * of <code>String#crypt</code> is wrong; it has a typo in
+ * "round=" (lacks "s"). However the call does not fail and
+ * something unexpected is generated.
+ *
+ * "foo".crypt("$5$rounds=1000$salt$") # OK, proper usage
+ * "foo".crypt("$5$round=1000$salt$") # Typo not detected
+ *
+ * * Even in the "modular" mode, some hash functions are considered
+ * archaic and no longer recommended at all; for instance module
+ * <code>$1$</code> is officially abandoned by its author: see
+ * http://phk.freebsd.dk/sagas/md5crypt_eol.html . For another
+ * instance module <code>$3$</code> is considered completely
+ * broken: see the manpage of FreeBSD.
+ *
+ * * On some OS such as Mac OS, there is no modular mode. Yet, as
+ * written above, <code>crypt(3)</code> on Mac OS never fails.
+ * This means even if you build up a proper salt string it
+ * generates a traditional DES hash anyways, and there is no way
+ * for you to be aware of.
+ *
+ * "foo".crypt("$5$rounds=1000$salt$") # => "$5fNPQMxC5j6."
*
* If for some reason you cannot migrate to other secure contemporary
* password hashing algorithms, install the string-crypt gem and