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authornagachika <nagachika@b2dd03c8-39d4-4d8f-98ff-823fe69b080e>2015-04-13 13:13:01 +0000
committernagachika <nagachika@b2dd03c8-39d4-4d8f-98ff-823fe69b080e>2015-04-13 13:13:01 +0000
commit15edfd96a2a1e32e3835b078c3464a5eb20ff918 (patch)
tree2a6b5f3882ef1037a5908e1bcff0daa1aa08c1bc /test
parentc620acaced507cd0d61e7e9d7acbeca9cb99f158 (diff)
merge revision(s) 50292: [Backport #9644]
* ext/openssl/lib/openssl/ssl.rb: stricter hostname verification following RFC 6125. with the patch provided by Tony Arcieri and Hiroshi Nakamura [ruby-core:61545] [Bug #9644] * test/openssl/test_ssl.rb: add tests for above. git-svn-id: svn+ssh://ci.ruby-lang.org/ruby/branches/ruby_2_2@50293 b2dd03c8-39d4-4d8f-98ff-823fe69b080e
Diffstat (limited to 'test')
-rw-r--r--test/openssl/test_ssl.rb150
1 files changed, 150 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/test/openssl/test_ssl.rb b/test/openssl/test_ssl.rb
index 3eddb0a8e8..3ffddf8884 100644
--- a/test/openssl/test_ssl.rb
+++ b/test/openssl/test_ssl.rb
@@ -426,6 +426,156 @@ class OpenSSL::TestSSL < OpenSSL::SSLTestCase
end
end
+ def test_verify_hostname
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_hostname("www.example.com", "*.example.com"))
+ assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_hostname("www.subdomain.example.com", "*.example.com"))
+ end
+
+ def test_verify_wildcard
+ assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_wildcard("foo", "x*"))
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_wildcard("foo", "foo"))
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_wildcard("foo", "f*"))
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_wildcard("foo", "*"))
+ assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_wildcard("abc*bcd", "abcd"))
+ assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_wildcard("xn--qdk4b9b", "x*"))
+ assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_wildcard("xn--qdk4b9b", "*--qdk4b9b"))
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_wildcard("xn--qdk4b9b", "xn--qdk4b9b"))
+ end
+
+ # Comments in this test is excerpted from http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#page-27
+ def test_post_connection_check_wildcard_san
+ # case-insensitive ASCII comparison
+ # RFC 6125, section 6.4.1
+ #
+ # "..matching of the reference identifier against the presented identifier
+ # is performed by comparing the set of domain name labels using a
+ # case-insensitive ASCII comparison, as clarified by [DNS-CASE] (e.g.,
+ # "WWW.Example.Com" would be lower-cased to "www.example.com" for
+ # comparison purposes)
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_san('DNS:*.example.com'), 'www.example.com'))
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_san('DNS:*.Example.COM'), 'www.example.com'))
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_san('DNS:*.example.com'), 'WWW.Example.COM'))
+ # 1. The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier in
+ # which the wildcard character comprises a label other than the
+ # left-most label (e.g., do not match bar.*.example.net).
+ assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_san('DNS:www.*.com'), 'www.example.com'))
+ # 2. If the wildcard character is the only character of the left-most
+ # label in the presented identifier, the client SHOULD NOT compare
+ # against anything but the left-most label of the reference
+ # identifier (e.g., *.example.com would match foo.example.com but
+ # not bar.foo.example.com or example.com).
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_san('DNS:*.example.com'), 'foo.example.com'))
+ assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_san('DNS:*.example.com'), 'bar.foo.example.com'))
+ # 3. The client MAY match a presented identifier in which the wildcard
+ # character is not the only character of the label (e.g.,
+ # baz*.example.net and *baz.example.net and b*z.example.net would
+ # be taken to match baz1.example.net and foobaz.example.net and
+ # buzz.example.net, respectively). ...
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_san('DNS:baz*.example.com'), 'baz1.example.com'))
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_san('DNS:*baz.example.com'), 'foobaz.example.com'))
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_san('DNS:b*z.example.com'), 'buzz.example.com'))
+ # Section 6.4.3 of RFC6125 states that client should NOT match identifier
+ # where wildcard is other than left-most label.
+ #
+ # Also implicitly mentions the wildcard character only in singular form,
+ # and discourages matching against more than one wildcard.
+ #
+ # See RFC 6125, section 7.2, subitem 2.
+ assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_san('DNS:*b*.example.com'), 'abc.example.com'))
+ assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_san('DNS:*b*.example.com'), 'ab.example.com'))
+ assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_san('DNS:*b*.example.com'), 'bc.example.com'))
+ # ... However, the client SHOULD NOT
+ # attempt to match a presented identifier where the wildcard
+ # character is embedded within an A-label or U-label [IDNA-DEFS] of
+ # an internationalized domain name [IDNA-PROTO].
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_san('DNS:xn*.example.com'), 'xn1ca.example.com'))
+ # part of A-label
+ assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_san('DNS:xn--*.example.com'), 'xn--1ca.example.com'))
+ # part of U-label
+ # dNSName in RFC5280 is an IA5String so U-label should NOT be allowed
+ # regardless of wildcard.
+ #
+ # See Section 7.2 of RFC 5280:
+ # IA5String is limited to the set of ASCII characters.
+ assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_san('DNS:á*.example.com'), 'á1.example.com'))
+ end
+
+ def test_post_connection_check_wildcard_cn
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_name('*.example.com'), 'www.example.com'))
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_name('*.Example.COM'), 'www.example.com'))
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_name('*.example.com'), 'WWW.Example.COM'))
+ assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_name('www.*.com'), 'www.example.com'))
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_name('*.example.com'), 'foo.example.com'))
+ assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_name('*.example.com'), 'bar.foo.example.com'))
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_name('baz*.example.com'), 'baz1.example.com'))
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_name('*baz.example.com'), 'foobaz.example.com'))
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_name('b*z.example.com'), 'buzz.example.com'))
+ # Section 6.4.3 of RFC6125 states that client should NOT match identifier
+ # where wildcard is other than left-most label.
+ #
+ # Also implicitly mentions the wildcard character only in singular form,
+ # and discourages matching against more than one wildcard.
+ #
+ # See RFC 6125, section 7.2, subitem 2.
+ assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_name('*b*.example.com'), 'abc.example.com'))
+ assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_name('*b*.example.com'), 'ab.example.com'))
+ assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_name('*b*.example.com'), 'bc.example.com'))
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_name('xn*.example.com'), 'xn1ca.example.com'))
+ assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_name('xn--*.example.com'), 'xn--1ca.example.com'))
+ # part of U-label
+ # Subject in RFC5280 states case-insensitive ASCII comparison.
+ #
+ # See Section 7.2 of RFC 5280:
+ # IA5String is limited to the set of ASCII characters.
+ assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_name('á*.example.com'), 'á1.example.com'))
+ end
+
+ def create_cert_with_san(san)
+ ef = OpenSSL::X509::ExtensionFactory.new
+ cert = OpenSSL::X509::Certificate.new
+ cert.subject = OpenSSL::X509::Name.parse("/DC=some/DC=site/CN=Some Site")
+ ext = ef.create_ext('subjectAltName', san)
+ cert.add_extension(ext)
+ cert
+ end
+
+ def create_cert_with_name(name)
+ cert = OpenSSL::X509::Certificate.new
+ cert.subject = OpenSSL::X509::Name.new([['DC', 'some'], ['DC', 'site'], ['CN', name]])
+ cert
+ end
+
+
# Create NULL byte SAN certificate
def create_null_byte_SAN_certificate(critical = false)
ef = OpenSSL::X509::ExtensionFactory.new