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authorusa <usa@b2dd03c8-39d4-4d8f-98ff-823fe69b080e>2017-12-14 15:59:18 +0000
committerusa <usa@b2dd03c8-39d4-4d8f-98ff-823fe69b080e>2017-12-14 15:59:18 +0000
commit72113d58cd2fc62b3f4ef3d2eb6cec37393532a4 (patch)
tree534843caaea28f1171378c1ac5bea0184ed04054 /ruby_2_2/ext/openssl/ossl_pkcs5.c
parent1a74fa4b04da04bd2bb33103dd3cf431438df38e (diff)
parent02b8978ff10b05304dbb46d73b49a2cf3a87cb92 (diff)
add tag v2_2_9v2_2_9
git-svn-id: svn+ssh://ci.ruby-lang.org/ruby/tags/v2_2_9@61259 b2dd03c8-39d4-4d8f-98ff-823fe69b080e
Diffstat (limited to 'ruby_2_2/ext/openssl/ossl_pkcs5.c')
-rw-r--r--ruby_2_2/ext/openssl/ossl_pkcs5.c189
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 189 deletions
diff --git a/ruby_2_2/ext/openssl/ossl_pkcs5.c b/ruby_2_2/ext/openssl/ossl_pkcs5.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 6c7738a2b2..0000000000
--- a/ruby_2_2/ext/openssl/ossl_pkcs5.c
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@@ -1,189 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * $Id$
- * Copyright (C) 2007 Technorama Ltd. <oss-ruby@technorama.net>
- */
-#include "ossl.h"
-
-VALUE mPKCS5;
-VALUE ePKCS5;
-
-#ifdef HAVE_PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC
-/*
- * call-seq:
- * PKCS5.pbkdf2_hmac(pass, salt, iter, keylen, digest) => string
- *
- * === Parameters
- * * +pass+ - string
- * * +salt+ - string - should be at least 8 bytes long.
- * * +iter+ - integer - should be greater than 1000. 20000 is better.
- * * +keylen+ - integer
- * * +digest+ - a string or OpenSSL::Digest object.
- *
- * Available in OpenSSL 0.9.4.
- *
- * Digests other than SHA1 may not be supported by other cryptography libraries.
- */
-static VALUE
-ossl_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac(VALUE self, VALUE pass, VALUE salt, VALUE iter, VALUE keylen, VALUE digest)
-{
- VALUE str;
- const EVP_MD *md;
- int len = NUM2INT(keylen);
-
- StringValue(pass);
- StringValue(salt);
- md = GetDigestPtr(digest);
-
- str = rb_str_new(0, len);
-
- if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(RSTRING_PTR(pass), RSTRING_LENINT(pass),
- (unsigned char *)RSTRING_PTR(salt), RSTRING_LENINT(salt),
- NUM2INT(iter), md, len,
- (unsigned char *)RSTRING_PTR(str)) != 1)
- ossl_raise(ePKCS5, "PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC");
-
- return str;
-}
-#else
-#define ossl_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac rb_f_notimplement
-#endif
-
-
-#ifdef HAVE_PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1
-/*
- * call-seq:
- * PKCS5.pbkdf2_hmac_sha1(pass, salt, iter, keylen) => string
- *
- * === Parameters
- * * +pass+ - string
- * * +salt+ - string - should be at least 8 bytes long.
- * * +iter+ - integer - should be greater than 1000. 20000 is better.
- * * +keylen+ - integer
- *
- * This method is available in almost any version of OpenSSL.
- *
- * Conforms to rfc2898.
- */
-static VALUE
-ossl_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac_sha1(VALUE self, VALUE pass, VALUE salt, VALUE iter, VALUE keylen)
-{
- VALUE str;
- int len = NUM2INT(keylen);
-
- StringValue(pass);
- StringValue(salt);
-
- str = rb_str_new(0, len);
-
- if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(RSTRING_PTR(pass), RSTRING_LENINT(pass),
- (const unsigned char *)RSTRING_PTR(salt), RSTRING_LENINT(salt), NUM2INT(iter),
- len, (unsigned char *)RSTRING_PTR(str)) != 1)
- ossl_raise(ePKCS5, "PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1");
-
- return str;
-}
-#else
-#define ossl_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac_sha1 rb_f_notimplement
-#endif
-
-void
-Init_ossl_pkcs5(void)
-{
- /*
- * Password-based Encryption
- *
- */
-
- #if 0
- mOSSL = rb_define_module("OpenSSL"); /* let rdoc know about mOSSL */
- #endif
-
- /* Document-class: OpenSSL::PKCS5
- *
- * Provides password-based encryption functionality based on PKCS#5.
- * Typically used for securely deriving arbitrary length symmetric keys
- * to be used with an OpenSSL::Cipher from passwords. Another use case
- * is for storing passwords: Due to the ability to tweak the effort of
- * computation by increasing the iteration count, computation can be
- * slowed down artificially in order to render possible attacks infeasible.
- *
- * PKCS5 offers support for PBKDF2 with an OpenSSL::Digest::SHA1-based
- * HMAC, or an arbitrary Digest if the underlying version of OpenSSL
- * already supports it (>= 0.9.4).
- *
- * === Parameters
- * ==== Password
- * Typically an arbitrary String that represents the password to be used
- * for deriving a key.
- * ==== Salt
- * Prevents attacks based on dictionaries of common passwords. It is a
- * public value that can be safely stored along with the password (e.g.
- * if PBKDF2 is used for password storage). For maximum security, a fresh,
- * random salt should be generated for each stored password. According
- * to PKCS#5, a salt should be at least 8 bytes long.
- * ==== Iteration Count
- * Allows to tweak the length that the actual computation will take. The
- * larger the iteration count, the longer it will take.
- * ==== Key Length
- * Specifies the length in bytes of the output that will be generated.
- * Typically, the key length should be larger than or equal to the output
- * length of the underlying digest function, otherwise an attacker could
- * simply try to brute-force the key. According to PKCS#5, security is
- * limited by the output length of the underlying digest function, i.e.
- * security is not improved if a key length strictly larger than the
- * digest output length is chosen. Therefore, when using PKCS5 for
- * password storage, it suffices to store values equal to the digest
- * output length, nothing is gained by storing larger values.
- *
- * == Examples
- * === Generating a 128 bit key for a Cipher (e.g. AES)
- * pass = "secret"
- * salt = OpenSSL::Random.random_bytes(16)
- * iter = 20000
- * key_len = 16
- * key = OpenSSL::PKCS5.pbkdf2_hmac_sha1(pass, salt, iter, key_len)
- *
- * === Storing Passwords
- * pass = "secret"
- * salt = OpenSSL::Random.random_bytes(16) #store this with the generated value
- * iter = 20000
- * digest = OpenSSL::Digest::SHA256.new
- * len = digest.digest_length
- * #the final value to be stored
- * value = OpenSSL::PKCS5.pbkdf2_hmac(pass, salt, iter, len, digest)
- *
- * === Important Note on Checking Passwords
- * When comparing passwords provided by the user with previously stored
- * values, a common mistake made is comparing the two values using "==".
- * Typically, "==" short-circuits on evaluation, and is therefore
- * vulnerable to timing attacks. The proper way is to use a method that
- * always takes the same amount of time when comparing two values, thus
- * not leaking any information to potential attackers. To compare two
- * values, the following could be used:
- * def eql_time_cmp(a, b)
- * unless a.length == b.length
- * return false
- * end
- * cmp = b.bytes.to_a
- * result = 0
- * a.bytes.each_with_index {|c,i|
- * result |= c ^ cmp[i]
- * }
- * result == 0
- * end
- * Please note that the premature return in case of differing lengths
- * typically does not leak valuable information - when using PKCS#5, the
- * length of the values to be compared is of fixed size.
- */
-
- mPKCS5 = rb_define_module_under(mOSSL, "PKCS5");
- /* Document-class: OpenSSL::PKCS5::PKCS5Error
- *
- * Generic Exception class that is raised if an error occurs during a
- * computation.
- */
- ePKCS5 = rb_define_class_under(mPKCS5, "PKCS5Error", eOSSLError);
-
- rb_define_module_function(mPKCS5, "pbkdf2_hmac", ossl_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac, 5);
- rb_define_module_function(mPKCS5, "pbkdf2_hmac_sha1", ossl_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac_sha1, 4);
-}